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Abstract
This paper analyses the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of forest owners for insurance against
natural hazards such as ﬁre. The objective is to identify the determinants of forest owner’s
participation to insurance and insurance demand. In particular, we are interested in the impact
of diﬀerent types of public compensation: ﬁxed help, contingent ﬁxed help and insurance sub-
sidy. We also analyse the role played by the expected loss of forestry income, the uncertainty
characterizing the probability of occurrence of natural risks, and the characteristics of owners
and forest property. Some of these determinants explain either participation to insurance (e.g.,
ambiguity about the probability of occurrence of natural hazards) or insurance demand (e.g.,
the past perception of a public help in real life), some of them do not allow to explain the
owner’s insurance behaviour (e.g., having ever suﬀered from a ﬁre in the past) while the other
explain both the two behaviours (e.g., some types of public compensation).
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11 Introduction
In the world, natural hazards, such as ﬁre and storm, regularly destroy forests. For instance,
Windstorm Kyrill in 2007 has generated more than 54 million of cubic meters of timber damages
in Europe. More recently, in 2009, Windstorm Klaus has damaged 42 million of cubic meters in
the South-Western part of France. In the same way, in Greece, ﬁres have burned around 250.000
hectares in summer 2007. In European countries, storm and ﬁre are responsible for 70% of the total
forestry damages due to natural hazards, so that they are the two most important risks in European
forest sector (Schelhaas et al. [24]).
Moreover, climate change stresses the importance of such events. These natural disasters gener-
ate increasing ecological and ﬁnancial damages, and consumed a large proportion of governments’
budget1. To address increases in budgets, many forestry agencies (Kaval et al. [22]; Loomis et al.,
[11]) are putting increasing emphasis on programs about ﬁre prevention (such as prescribed burning
and mechanical fuel reduction) and supervision of forests against the departure of ﬁre. Several
public programs also encourage forest owners to reduce the risk of property damage from storm
(Bianco [2]; CEC [21]; FAO [9]). In the same way, insurance against natural disasters is encour-
aged by many governments. However, in Europe, we observe that insurance market strongly varies
accross countries. Even, for some European countries such as Greece where ﬁre during summer is
a critical issue, there is no private insurance. When such market exists, there are many diﬀerences
in implementation. For example, in Denmark and Sweden, more than 60% of forest owners are
insured against storms whereas insurance is not a current practice in France and Germany. Some
diﬀerences also appeared concerning insurance supply. In Spain, forest insurance is linked with
agriculture insurance. Danish insurance contract determines the level of public help. In Germany,
the insurance premium is subsidised in order to encourage insurance participation. In France, the
indemnity and the premium of the insurance contract proposed by the major insurer are ﬁxed and
independent of forest age.
Consequently, the forest insurance market in Europe is heterogeneous in terms of supply and
demand. This heterogeneity can be explained by public interventions observed in diﬀerent countries,
generally in addition with private insurance or in link with it (ﬁxed public ﬁnancial help after natural
disasters, contingent public ﬁnancial programs, insurance subsidy). For instance, after windstorms
Erwin and Klaus, repectively in 2005 and 2009, governments have implemented public ﬁnancial
help programs of 415 million euros in France and 110 million euros in Sweden, to partially cover
1In France, according to the Audit Oﬃce [1], around e130 million weould be devoted each year to prevention
against ﬁre and ﬁreﬁghting.
2damages, in spite of the existence of private insurance market. In Denmark, forest owners who were
victims of the exceptional natural catastrophes could beneﬁted from government assistance, but the
public support was conditional on the purchase of an insurance policy. In Germany, the premium of
ﬁre insurance is subsidised by half. There exists many public interventions after or before disasters
that can aﬀect the market insurance decision of private forest owners.
Although there exist some informations about such public contexts, there is no precise data
allowing to know precisely insurance decision and demand in the forest sector, and the eﬀect of
such public intervention on these decisions. Before bringing in economic incentive instruments to
contract private insurance, it is important to be aware of the factors that explain the decision to
participate to private insurance, and, in addition, it is also necessary to understand how insurance
demand is determined. To our knowledge, there are no such studies in the literature. This is the
main objective of this paper that aims at providing an empirical analysis of insurance participation
and the determinants of insurance demand in diﬀerent public intervention contexts.
The impact of public intervention on individual’s behaviour leads to theoretical and empirical
papers. From the theoretical point of view, some authors (Kaplow [12]; Coate [6]; Kelly and
Kleﬀner [13]; Kim and Schlesinger [14]; Raschky and Weck-Hannemann [23]) have shown, that
ex post ﬁnancial public help reduces incentives to insure or to adopt prevention action. More
generally Brunette and Couture [4] have theoretically proven that i) the presence of ex post public
ﬁnancial compensation induces the forest owner to reduce insurance, ii) an insurance-contingent help
program incites more to insurance than a ﬁxed public ﬁnancial help, and iii) the impact of subsidy on
insurance is less clear-cut. The authors have even conclude that, in certain conditions, the insurance
subsidy can have perverse eﬀect, in the sense that it induces less insurance than in the case with
no subsidy. From the experimental point of view, only two studies have analysed the impact of
public intervention on the insurance decision. In a general context, Kunreuther [15] was the ﬁrst to
study the impact of subsidised insurance premium on individual’s insurance behaviour. The author
shows that only half of the californians interviewed subscribed insurance contract against natural
catastrophes despite the existence of a high earthquake risk and a subsidised insurance. In a forest
sector, Brunette et al. [18] and [19] have realised experiments with private forest owners and have
tested the theoretical predictions of Brunette and Couture [4] on the eﬀect of public intervention
on insurance decision. The results of their experiments validate the theoretical predictions, and
obtained that subsidy reduces insurance demand. Both experiments bring qualitative results about
the eﬀects of some public intervention on insurance decision. To our knowledge, there is no study
that directly analyses these eﬀects with real insurance decisions. Moreover, these previous works
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speciﬁcally on the participation to insurance (i.e., the decision to subscribe insurance contract) in
order to understand why some forest owners are insured while others are not. This distinction is a
relevant issue because policy makers need such information in order to determine the eﬃcient level
of insurance, and to provide incentive measures to attain these eﬃcient levels.
Consequently, in this article, we are interested in the determinants of participation to insurance
and insurance demand taken into account the presence of public help after disaster. In other words,
we want to explain the insurance behaviour against natural hazards. We use an innovative way
to answer to these questions. We combine experiment data with real data in order to conduct an
estimation of the determinants of participation to insurance and insurance demand. Combining
revealed preference data and stated preference data is an increasingly used practice in resource
economics (Landry and Liu [16]). Our results show that the type of public help seems to be
important to explain insurance behaviour. While insurance subsidy has no impact on owner’s
choice, a ﬁxed help acts negatively on her/his participation to insurance. Moreover, we prove
that a contingent ﬁxed help has a positive eﬀect on participation to insurance and a negative
one on insurance demand. Other parameters seem to play a role in the forest owner’s insurance
decision process such as the precision about the probability of occurrence of natural hazard, the
level of forestry income or some characteristics of the owners (professional activity, decade of forest
acquisition) and of the forest resource (implementation of prevention activities).
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the collection and description of the data
while section 3 describes the model (economic and econometric). Section 4 indicates the results and
section 5 concludes.
2 Data: collection and description
2.1 Collection
The data used for this study were obtained during an experience realised on 42 non-industrial private
forest owners located in the Aquitaine region2. The participants were in an hypothetical framework
where they owned 12 hectares of maritime pine located in Aquitaine and were exposed to a ﬁre risk.
Each participant was submitted to four diﬀerent alternatives regarding the public compensation.
The ﬁrst alternative is the benchmark case with no public help (NH). The second alternative was a
ﬁxed help (FH) of 1500e awarded to the owner, whatever her/his insurance behaviour. The third
one was a contingent ﬁxed help (CFH) of 1500e awarded to the owner only if s/he is insured.
2For a detailed presentation of the experiment, the reader can refer to Brunette and al. [19]
4Finally, the fourth alternative is an insurance subsidy (IS) corresponding to 50% of ﬁre insurance
premium. These alternatives are currently used in some European countries: a ﬁxed help is awarded
by French government after catastrophic ﬁre or storm, a contingent one is used in Denmark for storm
while insurance subsidy is used in Germany for insurance against ﬁre risk in forest sector. Moreover,
two levels of forestry income were tested, so that each owner faces 8 scenarios: 4 with a low income
of e250/hectare/year and 4 with a high income of e500/hectare/year.
The experience also tested the eﬀect of ambiguity characterizing the probability of occurrence of
ﬁre risk on insurance behaviour. Consequently, 24 subjects were placed in situation of ‘risky context’,
i.e., the probability of occurrence of risk is well-known and equals to 0.2%, while 18 participants
were in situation of ‘ambiguous context’. In the latter case, the individuals are informed that
experts give several probabilities of occurrence and that it is not possible to indicate which one is
more likely than the other3. Four potential probabilities of occurrence are provided4: 0.05%, 0.15%,
0.25% and 0.35%. For each scenario, the subject is asked to indicate her/his maximum WTP to be
fully covered against ﬁre risk.
At the end of the experience, the forest owners answer to a questionnaire about their personal
characteristics and also concerning their forest property.
Consequently, this experience provides us experiment data about the type of public compensa-
tion but also concerning the forestry income and the information about probability of occurrence
of ﬁre risk. Moreover, it brings real datas concerning owner’s characteristics. From these data, we
want to explain the WTP for insurance. We have 320 observations corresponding to the 8 WTPs
indicated by each of the 40 forest owners5. These WTP values allow us to diﬀerentiate partici-
pation to insurance and insurance demand. Participation to insurance is the choice to indicate a
positive WTP rather than a null one while insurance demand refers only to positive WTPs and the
diﬀerences in amount reported.
3The intuition behind this distinction is that it is more and more diﬃcult to obtain precise information on
probability of occurrence of natural hazards, especially due to the increase in the frequencies of disasters attributable
to climate change.
4This method is proposed by Gardenförs and Sahlin [10] and was often used to represent ambiguity in experiment
(Viscusi and Chesson [25], Cabantous [5]).
5Two forest owners were removed from the sample of this study because they had just participated to the experi-
mental part of the survey and they did not want to indicate personal information. The empirical application is based
on a sample of 40 forest owners.
52.2 Description
2.2.1 Explanatory variables
We classify the diﬀerent explanatory variables used in the empirical application in four categories:
the expected loss of forestry income, the type of public help, the risk context (‘risky’ or ‘ambiguous’),
and the characteristics of forest owners and forest property. The ﬁrst three categories of variables
come from experiment data while the last category concerns the real characteristics of subjects (i.e.,
the forest owners) and of their forest property.
Expected loss of forestry income (EL) The expected loss of forestry income is represented by
a binary variable taking the values e1/hectare or e0.5/hectare. Indeed, when the total potential
loss of forestry income is e500/hectare and the probability of occurrence of risk 0.2%, then the
expected loss is 500 × 0.2/100 = 1. Similarly, when the total potential loss is e250/hectare then
the expected loss is 250×0.2/100 = 0.5. Each forest owner faces the two levels of income, thus EL
is a within-subject variable.
Type of public help (PH) As said above, there are three types of public help in our experiment
called ﬁxed help, contingent ﬁxed help and insurance subsidy, and a benchmark case with no help.
Each participant faces two times each of the four alternatives, according to the two possible values
of expected loss.
Risk context (RC) This binary variable indicates the type of environment concerning the oc-
curence of ﬁre risk facing the subject, and makes it possible to take into account the notion of am-
biguity. 40% of the forest owners interviewed was submitted to an ‘ambiguous’ context (RC = 1),
i.e., the probability of occurrence of ﬁre risk is imprecise, while 60% faces a ‘risky’ context (RC = 0)
with a probability of ﬁre of 0.2%.
Characteristics of owners and forest property (CH) The characteristics of forest owners
and their associated statistics are given in Table 4. From this ﬁgures, it is possible to describe
a representative forest owner: he is an old man (around 60 years), living in couple, retired or
farmers (67.5% of the owners belongs to one of these categories), with high incomes (greater than
e2000/month for 57.5% of owners) and having followed the higher education (55% has a baccalau-
reate or more). The characteristics of forest property are in Table 5. The representative property
is a forest area of 241 hectares located in Aquitaine (95%), acquired recently (for 45% of owners,
acquisition decade is only 20 years) by heritage or by a combination ‘heritage - purchase’ (for 70%
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(75% declare to make self-insurance practices) and representing less than 10% of the forest owner’s
holding (for 30% of owners).
Some of these results are consistent with a French survey on forest owners (Agreste [8]). For
exemple, this survey indicates that the main activity of French forest owners is retired and the
second one is farmer. In the same way, the majority of French forest owners acquired its property
by heritage. However, a diﬀerence appears concerning the average forestry area. We obtain around
240 hectares while this survey shows an average of 8.8 hectares in France. It seems that our sample
is composed with forest properties larger than the national mean.
2.2.2 Explained variable
The variable to explain is the WTP for insurance against ﬁre risk. In Table 3, we present means
of explanatory variables according to participation to insurance. The total sample contains 320
observations. WTP are zero for n1 = 41 observations of the sample and the others are strictly
positive (n2 = 279). It allows to identify two representative decisions. First, the representative
decision of insurance rejection is taken by a forest owner who is retired (39.02%), has acquired the
forest by heritage (56.10%), has a forest area of 76.97 hectares, undertakes self-insurance activities
(75.61%), has ever suﬀered from a ﬁre (39.05%) but does not possess an insurance contract against
ﬁre (2.44%). Moreover, this decision is adopted when a ﬁxed help was tested (36.58%), in a risky
context (68.29%) and with a low income (53.66%). Second, the representative decision to indicate a
positive WTP for insurance is taken by a forest owner who is retired (43.01%), has a forest property
of 265.16 hectares, perceives a high income (average category of 3.11), has ever suﬀered from a
ﬁre in the past (45.88%) and possesses a ﬁre insurance policy (25.45%). Moreover, this decision
is adopted whatever the type of the public help tested because around 25% of the positive WTPs
appeared with each type of public instrument, in a risky context (58.78%) and whatever the level
of income with 50% of positive WTPs in a low-income scenario and the other half in a high-income
scenario.
The analysis of positive WTPs gives valuable information, in particular in studying the ratio
‘premium/indemnity’. Table 1 presents the values of this ratio according to the type of public
help. In our study, as we ask to the subject to indicate their maximum WTP to be fully covered
against the risk, the premium is the WTP and the indemnity is the level of income (e500/hectare
or e250/hectare).
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Help
NH FH CFH IS
WTP > 0 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.014
Note: N = 279 observations.
We note that insurance demand is higher when the government pays 50% of the ﬁre insurance
premium, after when no help is awarded, next with a ﬁxed help or a contingent ﬁxed help.
3 The Model
We use a simple structural model of choice between being (totally) insured against ﬁre risk and
not being insured6. It is based on the random utility model (RUM, McFadden [20]). The indirect
utility v of the respondent i for insurance level qi is written as:
vi = v(qi,INCi,Xi,ǫi), (1)
where INCi represents the total income of the ith forest owner, Xi = {PHi,RCi,CHi} is the set of
explanatory variables deﬁned above, and ǫi is an error term for unobserved variations in preferences.
For sake of simplicity, we suppose that total insurance corresponds to qi = 1 (whereas qi = 0 means
no insurance). Since qi is the same for all forest owners, it does not appear anymore in our model
in the rest of this section.
Let the subscripts ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively denote two possible levels of utility according to the
participation of insurance (1 for insurance). The forest owner i will be willing to pay the amount
ti ≥ 0 for insurance if the utility in state ‘1’, net to the required payment, exceeds the utility in
state ‘0’ taking into account the expected loss (EL) in case of ﬁre:
v1(INCi − ti,Xi,ǫ1i) ≥ v0(INCi − ELi,Xi,ǫ0i), (2)
For many applications, the simplest form of the indirect utility function is that where the explanatory
6This assumption of indivisibility of the amount of insurance is an acceptable estimate in the French case where
the partial insurance is relatively little spread and where lots of the contracts of partial insurance are deﬁned by
insurers and do not correspond to an arbitration of insurees.
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v0 = α01 + α02(INCi − ELi) + α03Xi + ǫ0i,
v1 = α11 + α12(INCi − ti) + α13Xi + ǫ1i.
From these deﬁnitions of indirect utility, we can write:
v1 − v0 = α1 + α2INCi − α12ti + α02ELi + α3Xi + ǫ01i, (3)
where α1 = α11 − α01, α2 = α12 − α02 and α3 = α13 − α03. Finally, ǫ01i = ǫ1i − ǫ0i is the new error
term.
From equation (3) the owner’s maximum WTP is given by the value WTPi = ti that solves
v1 − v0 = 0, that is
WTPi =
α1 + α2INCi + α02ELi + α3Xi + ǫ01i
α12
. (4)
We can rewrite this regression equation as:
WTPi = β1 + β2INCi + β3ELi + β4Xi + ui, (5)
with β1 = α1/α12, β2 = α2/α12, β3 = α02/α12, β4 = α3/α12 and ui = ǫ01i/α12. To simplify the
notation, we can rewrite equation (5) as:
WTPi = XWiβ + ui, (6)
where XW = {1,INC,EL,X} and β = {β1,β2,β3,β4}.
With the presence of a large number of zero responses, a classical method is to use a Tobit model
for censored data. However, the censoring mechanism and the outcome variable (i.e., the WTP)
may be modeled using separate processes. In our study, in explaining individual WTP for insurance
against ﬁre risk, one can ﬁrst model the participation to insurance by a selection (or participation)
equation:
Z∗
i = XZiγ + vi, (7)
where Z∗
i is a latent variable, XZi a vector of exogenous variables (the same that those explaining the
variations of WTP values, though can also be diﬀerent) and γ the associated vector of parameters.7
7The sample rule is Zi = 1 if Z
∗
i > 0 and 0 otherwise, and can be represented by a Probit model: P(Zi = 1) =
Φ(XZiγ), where Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
9The second process may explain the WTP associated with the participation to insurance:
WTPi =



XWiβ + ui if Z∗
i > 0
0 otherwise
(8)
The parameters β and γ of the sample selection model composed of equations (7) and (8) can be
eﬃciently estimated by full maximum likelihood method. ui and vi are the random disturbances
following a bivariate normal distribution: (ui,vi) ∼ BV N(0,0,σ,1,ρ), with zero means, ρ the
correlation coeﬃcient (between ui and vi) and σ the variance of ui. Both parameters ρ and σ are
to be estimated.
The set of exogeneous variables XZ can in theory be exactly the same as XW because of the
(non linear) parametric assumptions on the distribution of errors. In some cases, it is possible to
have identiﬁcation problems when any restriction on the regressors is made. However, in many
applications as in ours, it can be very diﬃcult to make defensible exclusion restrictions.
4 Results
4.1 Preliminaries: clustering and adjustment
In our experiment, each forest owner reports as many WTP as they are scenarios (eight in total).
Hence, we have to take into account the clustering of individual observations (Wooldridge [26]). In
particular, the standard errors are biased when we use usual estimation methods such as ordinary
least squares or maximum likelihood, because of the presence of an unobserved cluster eﬀect in
the error term. In our estimation, the standard errors are corrected to allow intra-subject (i.e.,
forest owner) correlation. Estimates of the complete model (regression and selection equations) are
reported in Table 2.
Before commenting estimation results, it is important to do some remarks on the adjustment of
the model. First, the null hypothesis that ρ is zero is largely rejected at the 1% level, indicating
the validity of jointly estimate the participation to insurance (selection equation) and the insurance
demand (WTP equation). Second, the reported model χ2 test (a Wald test) testing that all co-
eﬃcients in the regression equation (except the constant) are 0, shows that the regressors explain
globally well the variations in WTP values.
10Table 2: Estimation results of the selection model
Robust
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
WTP equation
Intercept 16.358∗ 8.660
INC -0.568 0.662
EL 4.841∗∗ 2.050
FH 0.564 0.671
CFH -0.600∗ 0.324
IS 2.177 1.811
Pers -5.002 3.259
Child 2.624 1.857
Retired -3.448 3.611
Farmer -5.475∗∗ 2.612
PubHelp -4.135∗∗ 2.103
Selection equation
Intercept -3.635∗∗ 1.446
INC 0.207 0.287
EL 0.454∗ 0.267
RC 1.136∗∗ 0.503
FH -0.534∗∗∗ 0.155
CFH 0.291∗∗ 0.141
IS -0.106 0.185
Pers 0.599 0.458
Child -0.769 0.498
Retired 1.985∗∗ 0.887
Farmer 2.392∗∗∗ 0.881
PubHelp 0.061 0.605
Contract 3.279∗ 1.822
Decade 0.397∗∗ 0.166
Self -0.790∗ 0.433
ρ -0.618∗∗∗ 0.216
σ 9.337∗∗∗ 2.630
Wald test of independent eqns: ρ = 0
χ2
(1) 18.44 (0.0000)
Log-likelihood -1086.346
χ2
(10) 21.11 (0.0204)
Notes: Total number of observations: 320
Censored observations: 41
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ : 10%
Standard errors robust to within-cluster correlation
114.2 Expected loss
The variable (EL) has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect both on participation to insurance (Coef.
= 0.454) and insurance demand (Coef. = 4.841). This means that as the expected loss increases,
the forest owner’s incentives to insure raise and the amount that s/he is ready to pay to be fully
covered raises also. In other words, as EL is a binary variable (e0.5/hectare or e1/hectare) built
from the total potential loss (e250/hectare or e500/hectare), we have the following obvious result:
the higher the commercial value of forest is (i.e., the higher the potential loss is), the more the forest
owner is encouraged to insure and the higher the insurance demand is.
4.3 Type of public help
Three types of public help were analysed: IS, FH and CFH. First, it seems that insurance subsidy
(IS) has no eﬀect both on individual’s participation to insurance and insurance demand. On that
account, the system adopts by Germany to incite forest owners to insure against ﬁre risk seems
to have no eﬀect on their behaviour. This result is diﬀerent from Kunreuther [15] who shows that
with a subsidised insurance, half of the Californian households interviewed subscribes an insurance
contract against earthquake.
Second, the variable FH has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on participation to insurance at
the 1% level (Coef. = -0.534). This means that a ﬁxed help discourages owner to subscribe insur-
ance contract. For that reason, the type of public compensation prioritised by French government
represents a brake to forest owner’s insurance. This result reﬂects the so-called ‘Charity Hazard’
deﬁned by Browne and Hoyt [3] as follows: “tendency of an individual at risk not to procure insur-
ance or other risk ﬁnancing as a result of a reliance on expected charity from others such as friends,
family, community, non-proﬁt organisations, or a government emergency program”. Consequently,
the forest owners’ failure to insure is a consequence of the compensation provided by government
disaster relief programs.
Third, the variable CFH has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on participation to insurance
(Coef. = 0.291) and a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on insurance demand (Coef. = -0.600). On
the one hand, in order to perceive a contingent ﬁxed help, the forest owner is constrained to take out
insurance, so that it is a really persuasive mean to increase the participation to insurance. On the
other hand, when government awards a contingent ﬁxed help, then the owner’s WTP is decreased
compared to a situation with no public help. This behaviour is consistent because, when the owner
receives a public help, s/he needs a lower insurance indemnity to keep a constant level of coverage.
In case of disaster, a part of the loss is covered by insurance and the other part by government’s
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Among these three public programs, it seems that the contingent ﬁxed help is better to encourage
forest owner to indicate a positive WTP for insurance than the others.
4.4 Risk context
The variable RC has a signiﬁcant and positive impact at the 5% level on participation to insurance
(Coef. = 1.136). This implies that, in presence of ambiguity concerning the probability of occurrence
of ﬁre, the forest owner wants to transfer risk to insurance company more than when the probability
of occurrence of ﬁre is precise. This result seems to suggest that, in a context where climate change
modiﬁes the frequency of ﬁre and leads to imprecision in estimation of risk, the individuals will use
more insurance contract.
4.5 Characteristics
4.5.1 Personal characteristics of forest owner
First, to be a farmer has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on participation to insurance (Coef. =
2.392) and a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on insurance demand (Coef. = -5.475). Farmers are
sensitive to natural hazards because cultivation of land is a risky activity associated to a well-known
insurance scheme, so that they have incentives to protect their forest. Nevertheless, the management
of forest is only a secondary activity for a farmer, so that s/he prioritise agriculture and opts for a
lower forest insurance demand. This last result is diﬀerent from Lönnstedt and Svensson [17] who
indicate that “forest owners who works actively with farming and forestry are prepared to take risks
in the areas that they know best”.
Second, it appears that belonging to the category of retired person increases the probability to
insure (Coef. = 1.985). We can consider that the main objective of retired is to transfer capital to
their family, so that they might be incited to protect their forest asset against ﬁre.
4.5.2 Characteristics of forest stand
First, if the owner is insured in real life (proxied by the variable Contract), then she/he is encouraged
to adopt an insurance policy. This result seems trivial: as the owner has already subscribed an
insurance in real life, there is no reason why s/he refuses to pay an insurance in hypothetical
situation.
Second, the variable Self indicating the implementation of self-insurance activities by the forest
owners, has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on participation to insurance (Coef. = -0.790). This
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insurance policy because the ﬁre risk is less. This result seems to suggest substitutability between
insurance and self-insurance, according to the well-known theoretical result of Ehrlich and Becker [7].
Third, the decade of forest acquisition seems to play a signiﬁcant role in the owner’s participation
to insurance (Coef. = 0.397). The more the forest is acquired recently, the more the owner is
encouraged to adopt insurance against ﬁre. The media coverage of recent naturals hazards associated
to climate change and its impact on frequency and damage of natural events could be an explanation
of the behaviour of the new forest owners.
Finally, as expected, received a public compensation in real life (PubHelp) has a signiﬁcant and
negative eﬀect on insurance demand (Coef. = -4.135). This negative relationship between public
help and insurance demand conﬁrms the well-established theoretical result obtain by authors like
Kaplow [12]; Coate [6]; Kelly and Kleﬀner [13]; Kim and Schlesinger [14]; Raschky and Weck-
Hannemann [23]; Brunette and Couture [4].
We can note that some variables could be expected to inﬂuence participation to insurance or
insurance demand but play any role in our empirical application. For instance, we could expect that
the variable Fire, which indicates whether the forest owner has suﬀered from a ﬁre in the past, has
a positive eﬀect on participation to insurance but it is not the case. The ‘Gambler fallacy eﬀect’
could be an explanation for this result: individuals underestimate the probability of occurrence of
an event already observed, so that they decide not to protect their forest assets. In the same way,
we could expect that the variable INC, representing the total income of the forest owners, has a
positive eﬀect on insurance demand but, again, it has no impact. A reason is that the consistent
variable here is the forestry income represented by the variable EL which has a signiﬁcant and
positive eﬀect both on participation to insurance and insurance demand.
5 Conclusion
This paper analysed the forest owner’s participation to insurance and insurance demand against
ﬁre risk. In particular, we try to explain why some forest owners are insured while others are not
focusing on the role of public compensation. The results indicate that the type of public help seems
to be an important determinant during the forest owner’s insurance decision process. Thus, the
German system of insurance subsidy has no impact on forest owner’s insurance behaviour. Inversely,
the French system (ﬁxed help) seems to discourage forest owners to adopt insurance contract while
Danish one (contingent ﬁxed help) encourage them to subscribe insurance policy. In addition to
that, a contingent ﬁxed help acts as a complement to insurance so that it reduces insurance demand.
14Other results appeared according to the three other explanatory variables. First, the higher the
expected loss (due to higher forest commercial value or to higher risk) is, the more the incentives to
insure and the demand of insurance are. Second, an ambiguous probability of natural risk occurrence
leads to an increase in participation to insurance. Third, some forest owner’s characteristics play
an important role such as profession. Some forest property’s characteristics are also of interest such
as decade of forest acquisition, insurance contract in real life or the fact to have ever perceived a
public help in real life.
These results are of particular interest in a context of climate change because countries should
face much more frequent natural hazards with higher damages and, they should adapt their current
forest insurance scheme. Our results suggest that the more eﬃcient type of public help, in terms of
incentives to coverage, is the Danish contingent ﬁxed help. This system, currently used for storm
risk, could be extended to forest ﬁre in France and consequently, represents a potential solution to
incite forest owners to adopt insurance. The implementation of contingent ﬁxed help could have
several positive consequences for the French policymaker. First, as it incites the forest owner to
adopt insurance policy, this system can contribute to the reduction of public funds engaged in
compensation of victims and, on that account increases ﬁreﬁghting budget. Second, it is a mean
for policymaker to inform the forest owners of the risk and to give them the sense of responsibility.
Third, the cost of this implementation can be very low compared to a deeper reform of the French
forest insurance scheme. Indeed, as in Denmark, the French government can entrust the insurance
companies proposing policy against forest ﬁre to distribute the public help, at the same time of
insurance indemnity.
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17Table 3: Insurance decision
Variable WTP
null (n1=41) positive (n2=279)
CHARACTERISTICS
Age (in years) 58.27 58.16
Education level (average category) 1.66 2.38
Number of persons in the home 2.32 2.58
Number of children 0.88 0.90
Property area (in hectare) 76.97 265.16
Fire occurrence 39.02% 45.88%
Public help 4.88% 10.75%
Revenue (average category) 2.41 3.11
Fire insurance contract 2.44% 25.45%
Part of forest in the patrimony (average category) 3.83 4.54
Self-insurance activities 75.61% 74.91%
Decade of forest acquisition (average category) 3.32 4.87
Percentage of forest in Aquitaine 92.68% 95.34%
Profession
Retired persons 39.02% 43.01%
Farmers 24.39% 25.09%
Intermediate professions 0% 2.87%
Employees 19.51% 5.73%
Cadres 9.76% 21.50%
Others 7.32% 1.79%
Mode of forest acquisition
Heritage 56.10% 34.77%
Purchase 29.27% 15.77%
Alliance 2.44% 5.38%
Heritage and purchase 12.19% 35.48%
Heritage and alliance 0% 5.73%
Heritage, purchase and alliance 0% 2.87%
TYPE OF HELP
No help (NH) 21.95% 25.45%
Fixed help (FH) 36.58% 23.30%
Contingent ﬁxed help (CFH) 14.63% 26.52%
Insurance subsidy (IS) 26.83% 24.73%
RISK CONTEXT
Ambiguity 31.71% 41.22%
Risk 68.29% 58.78%
EXPECTED LOSS
Low 53.66% 49.46%
High 46.34% 50.54%
18Table 4: Demographic and social characteristics of forest owners
Variable Deﬁnition Nb of individuals %
Sex Gender (Male) 35 87.5
Educ Educationa
Category 1 : GCSE 13 37.1
Category 2 : Baccalaureate 7 20
Category 3 : Baccalaureate +2, +3 and +4 7 20
Category 4 : Baccalaureate + 5 and more 8 22.9
Profession
retired Retired persons 17 42.5
farmer Farmers 10 25
ip Intermediate professions 1 2.5
emp Employees 3 7.5
cadres Cadres 8 20
others Others 1 2.5
Pers Number of persons in the home
1 3 7.5
2 22 55
3 5 12.5
4 and more 10 25
INC Income
Category 1 : <1000 6 15
Category 2 : 1000-2000 11 27.5
Category 3 : 2000-2500 9 22.5
Category 4 : 2500-3000 4 10
Category 5 : >3000 10 25
Mean Std. Dev.
Age Age (in years) 58 12.11
Child Number of children 0.9 1.11
Note: Total number of forest owners N = 40
a In the initial database, 5 forest owners do not answer this question.
We complete these missing data by mean values.
19Table 5: Components of owners’ forest property
Variable Deﬁnition Nb of individuals %
Decade Decade of forest acquisition
Category 1 : 1940 4 10
Category 2 : 1950 3 7.5
Category 3 : 1960 4 10
Category 4 : 1970 3 7.5
Category 5 : 1980 8 20
Category 6 : 1990 13 32.5
Category 7 : < 10 years 5 12.5
Mode Mode of forest acquisition
Heritage 15 37.5
Purchase 7 17.5
Alliance 2 5
Heritage and purchase 13 32.5
Heritage and alliance 2 5
Heritage, purchase and alliance 1 2.5
%Aquit % of forest located in Aquitaine 38 95
PubHelp Public help 4 10
Fire Fire occurrence 18 45
Self Self-insurance activities 30 75
Contract Fire insurance contract 9 22.5
%Forest % of forest in the patrimony
Category 1 : < 5% 11 27.5
Category 2 : 5 − 10% 1 2.5
Category 3 : 10 − 15% 4 10
Category 4 : 15 − 20% 3 7.5
Category 5 : 25 − 30% 6 15
Category 6 : 35 − 40% 4 10
Category 7 : 45 − 50% 1 2.5
Category 8 : > 50% 10 25
Mean Std. Dev.
Area Area of forest property (in hectare) 241 357.88
Note: Total number of forest owners N = 40
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